"Can Washington Get Development Right?" another DoD smackdown?

More food for my (f)ire about the political maneuverings here in DC between the Dept of State, and USAID.

Foreign Affairs has an interesting piece by J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson and Andrew Natsios called "Can Washington Get Development Right?" in the November/December 2008 edition (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20081001faessay87609/j-brian-atwood-m-peter-mcpherson-andrew-natsios/arrested-development.html). In it, the authors make a couple of strange statements:

...democracy-promotion programs and the Defense Department's aid programs around the world should largely return to civilian control, with the relevant authority and resources assigned to the new USAID. (pg 131)

DoD's aid programs? What aid programs, I wonder? Perhaps they are referring to DOD's mil-mil programs? Or how about the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance program? The OHDACA program is very small. Not even worth mentioning in an article about reforms that USAID needs published in Foreign Affairs.

Another odd statement:

Of course there will be areas of overlapping jurisdiction between the defense, diplomatic, and development institutions. One example is the provision of security assistance in countries recovering from conflict; in these difficult environments, the State Department's diplomatic mission is crucial and the Defense Department is needed for training and logistics. The key is who controls the money for noncombat activities. This authority belongs with the diplomatic mission. (p 132)

Huh? The Defense Department is needed for training and logistics, and not economic capacity building or providing security itself (vice "providing security assistance" used by the authors)? I wonder if the article was edited so dramatically that a portion of this paragraph was edited? It is so unbelievably simplistic that...well, it's unbelievable. The discussion of "combat" versus "noncombat" is difficult in post-conflict reconstruction settings. Bureaucracies must work hand in hand in this setting. The authors' maybe make a mistake in their brevity: trying to line up responsibilities in the manner suggested is simply not realistic. When military personnel are setting up clinics to treat local nationals, that is neither logistics nor training. Nor is it "combat" per se. So, how would these type of missions fall in the minds of Messrs. Atwood, McPherson and Natsios? I have a quibble with important people making simplistic little statements like this in important journals like Foreign Affairs.

The reason for my dismay is the same as in an earlier post. I think the "roles and responsibilities" question is being played too hard during this change-of-administration period to make the case for the Dept of State and USAID. It's time for serious thinkers to tell both the American public as well as the administration (both incoming and outgoing) that all agencies within the government have to work together. Roles and responsibilities are never going to be delineated in advance for all contexts. Nonetheless, the Dept of State and USAID must be enhanced in human and fiscal resources so they can work with other agencies, like the DoD. It's not "us" against "them". DoD is not hoarding all kinds of aid money, since it doesn't perceive itself to be an aid agency. DoD fights wars, first and foremost, and it also does stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations, just like always. Strong partners will make DoD's efforts more likely to end in success. I cannot say it more eloquently than Secretary Gates, writing in the current Foreign Affairs issue (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88103-p0/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy.html):

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign -- a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.

Gates' whole article is worth a read. And, on that note, there is an interesting editorial in today's Washington Post about USAID. The thrust of the editorial is that USAID personnel in Afghanistan are rendered ineffective by their inability to leave the security of their compounds.