The history of foreign aid: "Samaritan Diplomacy"?

Not only am I back from Afghanistan, where I had extremely limited access to the internet both in terms of time and actual connectivity, but I am also back from a 2 month long "victory lap," as a friend called it, of the U.S. I got to see great America, and it was great! Starting at the Statue of Liberty and heading west (with a northerly detour to Niagara falls) I got to see all those iconic US spots that I hadn't previously seen (the corn palace in Mitchell, SD; Mount Rushmore; Grand Canyon; Petrified Forest and the Painted Desert...you get the idea).

Now that Christmas is done and I can start to settle in, I am doing some reading. In my travels I found the third book of Daniel J. Boorstin's series called "The Americans", the third book is called "The Democractic Experience" published in 1974. At the end of the book he discusses "Samaritan Diplomacy" and the changes in US perspective from pre-Marshall plan when aid to other nations was considered unconstitutional, to post-Marshall plan when US aid was expanded beyond war reparations and European nations to under developed nations. (It was first expanded by Truman in his "fourth point".)

Boorstin starts this section off: "For most of the nation's history, the United States remained uncomfortable, inept and on the whole unsuccessful in diplomacy." (p 568) Interestingly, one of the first acts using the military for aid came in 1880 during one of the Irish potato famines. Congress passed a joint resolution that allowed the Secretary of the navy to use a naval vessel to carry volutary (privately donated) relief to the Irish. Later, this was regarded as a regrettable stretching of the Constitution to appease the Irish-American vote.

According to Boorstin, not until the Marshall plan was there enough political justification to use American tax money to assist other nations. The confusion of motives for the aid stems from this time: "The American institution of foreign aid was a by-product of World War II. It marked a new stage in American foreign policy in which charitable, fiscal, political, ideological, and military motives would be more confused than ever before. Incidentally, too, foreign aid would newly confuse the techniques, attitudes, and institutions of peace with those of war, and so would help open an era in American foreign relations when the American people were neither at war nor at peace." (p 574) Boorstin claims that "except in religious missions, the nation had no substantial precendent for a world-wide program of foreign aid....foreign aid now expressed faith that American wealth could raise the standard of living of people anywhere. A people with a higher, more nearly American standard of living, it was assumed, would be more apt to be democratic, and hence more apt to be peace-loving and friendly to the United States. Implied, also was the complementary assumption that poverty, misery and industrial backwardness would make any people less peaceful and less democratic, hence more prone to communism, and therefore more inclined to join the enemies of the United States." Of course, the assumptions have not always born out.

In fact, this discussion gave me pause, particularly in light of the steady drum beat of the Millenium Development Goals, the political and military discourse about globalization and "haves" versus "have nots", and the confusion over the common use of the term "humanitarian aid" (for purely humanitarian reasons? or for political motives?)

Also relevant, the theory of counter insurgency calls for massive development expenditures in dangerous areas in order to create sympathies for the legitimate government, in order to assist people attain their basic life needs--water food shelter--so they feel better about their government and 'buy in' to it's legitimacy, lay down arms and stop harboring terrorists. But, as pointed out in the Washington Post front page yesterday, it's not that easy. USAID and the US State Department in Afghanistan, for example, only want the military to provide "security" so they can provide development assistance. Yet their vision of security and the military version are disparate. And sometimes discussions about where to deliver development assistance veer toward the absurd when geographical areas are deemed "too safe" for development assistance and other areas not safe enough. USAID doesn't want to deliver aid where it's unsafe, and they don't want to waste their aid on places where it's too safe. And they damn sure don't want the military to meddle in their humanitarian space (as they call the battlefield) by delivering aid or creating development projects.

Boorstin had it right. It's a confusion that is not about to go away. Are we confusing the world with our own confusion? Is "smart power" truly smart?