The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy takes on StratComm

USD Policy has been undergoing significant reorganization lately, and it's shape and function is not exactly clear to those of us on the 'outside'. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is perhaps "The Source" of power within the Pentagon, and the new Undersecretary, Michele Flournoy, is trying to shape her office to be more responsive to the global context, it seems. Those of us around D.C. not within USD(P) are waiting to understand the new organization and it's new direction. The Defense News reported last week (URL:http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4190904&c=AME&s=TOP ) that Flournoy was going to put together a small team to shape communications both to Congress and to other US Govt agencies. The team will replace an office within USD(P) that used to be called "Support to Public Diplomacy". Flournoy disbanded the Support to Public Diplomacy office this year, seeking a fresh start to Strategic Communications efforts after the Support to Public Diplomacy office became embroiled in an internal conflict over it's issuances. (Apparently it was issuing 'propagandistic' information that soldiers in Afghanistan refused to use about casualty rates). While this all sounds rather archaic, it's not. The goal of the team is to coordinate Strategic Communications across DoD. I would suggest they start by reading the CENTCOM reports to Congress on progress in Afghanistan and Iraq. As I've blogged before the reports are pathetic at best, and do not show off the significant efforts in either theater of war.

As the U.S. tries to shape its global presence to positively effect and stabilize the international commons, it must be cognizant of its communications. It's all part of the "Smart Power" construct.

Strategic Communications Post-Conflict

I read an interesting document by Frances Fortune and Oscar Bloh called "Strategic Communication: The Heart of Post-Conflict Processes" published in Conflict Trends. I can't figure out where the source document is, but I received it via my subscription to the Human Security Gateway, which I highly recommend. The Human Security Gateway can be found here:http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/ and has LOTS of great resources.

The interesting thing about this piece is that the authors posit that if done well, a post-conflict government's communications can: a) manage citizen's expectations; b) engender ownership; c)promote inclusivity; d) strengthen transparency; e) improve credibility and confidence, and so forth. I think these are rose-colored-glasses statements. No doubt good communication is "good" on a binary scale of good and bad, and will enable citizens to understand their government. However the article starts off with this statement, which gives definition to "goodness" : "The overriding objective of any strategic communication is to engender change: a shift in citizens' attitudes (their perceptions) and behaviors (their actions) toward development and governance processes and how they own it." This statement elevates "strategic communication" into the mind-bending realm rather unrealistically.

The U.S. military is all wrapped around the information/communications pole similarly. And nobody seems to be reading the more than 30-years of literature on mass communications and its effect on populations' perceptions and behaviors. We know, for example, that there are very few mass media techniques that can change public behavior. We know that individuals can decide to change their behavior and can articulate the psychological stages that lead up to those changes. We also know what obstacles people face when trying to change their behavior and ways around those obstacles (thanks to Bandura, among others). Hence the idea that mass communication can change attitudes and perception as well as behaviors is very optimistic indeed. In fact, it's way over stated.

The role of information and health in the GWOT

I just added a fantastic blog that I follow, Mountain Runner. It's a blog about "public diplomacy", which is perhaps a mysterious term to the uninitiated. There are several discussions about the differences between, or tensions between, "public affairs", "information operations", and "public diplomacy". It seems to me, from the outside, that this debate over the proper roles and responsibilities of practitioners of each is somewhat like the false debate about the definition of terrorism. Definitions are symbols produced by their users which validate their perspectives and cause further definition of the environment. The point of bringing this up here is that information--whether it's passive or purposeful, to U.S. or outside audiences--is important. We can leave the definitions to the communities that struggle with them and focus on information communication for our purposes. While the topic of information-flow might seem tangential to the triad of health-national security-international relations that I propose to cover in this blog, it's not. Actions convey information, and lately I have been formulating a theory that a center of gravity for the GWOT might not really be "public opinion" since defining publics and their opinions during military operations is difficult. A center of gravity for the GWOT might instead (or additionally) be primary symbols. Recall the photos and TV coverage of soldiers pulling down the statute of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Simple example, but it conveys the point that symbols are powerful.

The use of information to actively change opinion might be more powerful if we understood the symobology of other people. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs sponsored a symposium on Culture, Health and Human security last week and two of the speakers discussed cultural creation of symbols. For example, I learned that there is a relatively specific culturally-derived view of women and health in the Jewish community. It strikes me that health, being at the very bottom of Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, is also perhaps a striking symbol that we should more carefully consider.

On December 12, the USS Kearsarge and USS Boxer will return to the U.S. after a trip to Latin America and the Caribbean where the staff delivered medical and veterinarian assistance to eight nations. There will be a media event at the University of Miami. Here's where there is more information: http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/index.php. These missions are designed to "foster goodwill and demonstrate U.S. commitment and support to Latin America and the Caribbean" according to the U.S. SOUTHCOM website. However it remains to be seen if these missions, which are being conducted in partner with other U.S. government partners like Health and Human Services, NGOs like Project Hope, and which are coordinated with the involvement of the public diplomacy community, are effective or efficient at communicating goodwill. It might be more effective, and more efficient, to examine the health symbols of the countries we visited and try to understand if there is a way to positively influence those symbols. This is not to say that these missions --the Comfort and Mercy included--are bad. It's easy to speculate from the comfort of one's own computer desk chair. However these missions are expensive and are using military resources so the question is a valid, if somewhat academic, question.

Switching focus to American audiences, the U.S. public is relatively unaware of these missions, which is unfortunate since we are a nation that likes to do good. And also a nation that likes to support its military. As symbols of both the military and our best wishes for the rest of mankind, these missions most likely could communicate powerfully to the American public. The current media focus seems to be on Latin American publics instead of the American public, oddly.

Consideration of symbols of cultures, and operationalizing a plan for communicating our intentions goes together. Creating good health for people around the world seems to be benign at worst, but are we sure?